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ABSTRACT 
Recently attention has focused on the role of social researchers in the processes 
of construction and transmission of knowledge about global poverty and its reduction. 
This paper examines some of the formative efforts by pioneering social researchers in 
development  institutions  to  step  into  the  realm  of  policy  making  to  construct 
processes  for  project  preparation  and  management  through  social  analysis.  Before 
1970 development planners invoked ‘social’ or ‘human’ factors only as an excuse to 
explain away project failures – they designed and implemented development projects 
in the absence of any strategies or regulatory frameworks for managing their social 
impacts.  Recognizing  that  project  investments  represent  induced  change  and 
constitute a social process in themselves, pioneering social researchers constructed 
policies and procedures to introduce sociological content and method into the project 
cycle and so re-order social outcomes. Were such constructs merely policy artefacts? 
Even as the constructs helped to shift the statements of the development discourse 
towards ‘people oriented’ poverty reduction, new modalities appeared which tested 
the limits of the agreed methods. Institutions may forget, neglect, contest or re-write 
the documents if in perceived conflict with the institutional ‘core business’. Yet those 
pioneering  efforts  created  institutional  space  for,  and  understanding  of,  social 
analysis, with a measure of flow-on international recognition. Tracking social analysis 
in several international institutions and in a significant emerging economy, China, this 
paper highlights not only a history full of lessons to be learned where social analysis 
is not practiced systematically but also outlines some future challenges.   
 
Keywords: induced development, social analysis, social impact assessment, 
resettlement, social safeguards, social management system.  
INTRODUCTION 
DECONSTRUCTION OR CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL PROCESS? 
Social researchers, through their close encounters with communities impacted 
by development policies and projects
1 are especially well placed to deconstruct the 
disjunctures and ambiguities of the development discourse – disjunctures between 
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1 A project may be defined as a set of interrelated expenditures designed to achieve, within a 
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underlying  narratives;  objectives;  strategies;  and  the  selection,  rollout  and 
outcomes of projects and programs in specific social contexts (de Sardan 2006). 
Social researchers may privilege such deconstruction as the basis for their critical 
engagement with development – or, alternatively, they may step purposefully into a 
constructivist orientation of social transformation (Green 2011).  
Recent  attention  to  ‘aidnography’,  or  the  anthropology  of  development 
professionals, has focused on a new site for ethnographic endeavour: the processes 
of  knowledge  creation  within  the  development  institutions  themselves  and  the 
‘transformations  that  occur  as  social  scientific  practices  cross  and  re-cross  the 
boundaries of policy making’ (Mosse 2011: ix). This paper focuses on the role of 
several pioneering social researchers who, not content simply to deconstruct those 
projects  which  had  failed  to  acknowledge  social  process,  or  to  translate  as 
knowledge  brokers  between  communities  and  aid  professionals,  set  about  to 
transform  social  ordering  through  consciously  remoulding  knowledge,  methods 
and  resources  in  new  forms  in  development  institutions.  Pioneering  social 
researchers  at  the  World  Bank  have  long  recognised  the  potential  for 
transformation  due,  specifically,  to  the  premeditated  nature  of  development 
interventions. For example, they contended that ‘while spontaneous development 
can only be observed and described by sociologists, an induced change is one that 
social scientists can influence, through knowledge and the direct participation in 
the design of programs’ (Cernea and Kudat 1997: 6). Social scientists would, in 
their  view,  achieve  this  direct  participation  by  acting  upon  sociological  and 
anthropological knowledge, as embodied in social analysis, to assess and design 
goal-directed development programs.   
 
PROJECTS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 
 
There was no shortage of failed project cases. When state sponsored projects 
or  private  sector  corporations  overlook  the  social  context  of  their  projects  the 
consequences can be dire, both for the project returns – for example, increased 
costs and delays
2 – and for the project area population. ‘Socially-blind’ investments 
risk jeopardizing their own success and sustainability – missing opportunities to 
engage local support; mis-matching with local conditions; misunderstanding social 
dynamics;  risking  impoverishment  of  people  affected;  and  triggering  other 
unintended  and  unwanted  impacts.  Projects  directed  towards  poverty  reduction 
objectives specifically risk overlooking the multi-dimensionality of socio-cultural 
dynamics, so bypassing the social factors of poverty.  
                                                 
2 An early study by Kottak reviewed 68 World Bank rural development projects and found that 
‘attention to the issues of socio-cultural compatibility’ presented pay-offs to projects in significantly 
increased  economic  rates  of  return;  conversely,  initial  socio-cultural  mismatch  resulted  in  lower 
returns (in Cernea 1991).   3  Social Analysis   
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Pioneering social researchers set about reversing such outcomes. Drawing 
lessons from such failures they re-ordered the objectives, content and method of 
development practice, recognizing that the social context in which development 
investments  are  to  be  implemented  is  indispensable  for  their  successful 
contribution to both economic and social development goals. This required social 
analysis during the earliest stages of investment selection, preparation, and design 
to  inform  the  process  of  implementation  and  completion  as  well  as  to  inform 
evaluation and feedback to future investments. It meant recognizing and engaging 
with  stakeholders  from  the  earliest  stages  right  through  the  investment  cycle. 
Forms  of  social  analysis,  originally  conceptualized  institutionally  as  tools  for 
planning  and  appraisal,  have,  from  the  beginning,  encompassed  sociological 
content and follow-on actions.  
SCOPE OF THE PAPER 
How did pioneering social specialists tackle the difficult ask of translating 
social science constructs into operational policies and procedures? How did they 
define the specific role and craft the methods for doing social analysis? How well 
did  they  bring  to  bear  the  approaches  of  engaged,  systematic,  direct  field 
immersion to obtain empirical data, into application in institutional space? How 
well  did  they  translate  the  theoretical  development  thinking  from  conceptual 
constructs into constructed realities? I examine the way in which social researchers 
defined and mapped social issues, championed methodologies for social analysis, 
generated social policies – and endeavoured to obtain recognition and resources for 
their application and oversight in development institutions.  
Review of pioneering policy and procedures of the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) reveals certain key elements that were critical to their 
effectiveness:  supportive  statements  of  objectives;  use  of  case  studies  to 
demonstrate how ‘socially-blind’ projects fail and may additionally wreak havoc 
on the social fabric; elaboration of sociological content and method; timing of steps 
matched to the key points of the project cycle; and specification of requisite social 
expertise.  Such  documents  formed  a  medium  through  which  many  social 
researchers interact both with development institutions, and with social actors at 
the micro-level.  
Are these policies and procedures merely cosmetic – simply elaborate policy 
artefacts, denied effective agency? Whereas writing the documents and securing 
support  for  their  approval  presents  one  very  significant  challenge,  securing  the 
necessary changes in work practice to achieve outcomes for people affected by 
development  projects  constitutes  another  –  turning  the  ‘text’  into  ‘effect’ 
(Bebbington et al. 2006). Problems in application include differing development 
constructs and priorities within institutions, together with differing expectations 
among  stakeholders  which  result  in  tokenism  through  limited  time,  skills  and   Susanna Price  4 
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resources in institutions and among borrowers. Organisations may forget, neglect, 
contest or re-write the documents if the requirements appear difficult or interfere 
with perceptions of ‘core business’.  
A  dynamic  and  evolving  development  discourse  shifted  from  economic 
growth objectives towards the social agenda, opening up opportunities for social 
analysis.  Yet,  perversely,  new  lending  modalities  appeared,  in  the  interests  of 
agency ‘core business’ which tested the limits of the agreed methods. This again 
challenged social analysts to formulate innovative approaches and instruments for 
social analysis that go beyond traditional project packages.  
China  emerges  as  a  significant  site  for  attention  as  the  government  and 
private  investment  fuel  rapid  growth,  both  in  China  and,  increasingly,  abroad. 
China’s  bourgeoning  development  assistance  aid  program  utilizes  project 
investments as the primary modality for delivery. Increasingly, China recognizes 
officially the need to balance between economic and social development objectives 
yet  strong  pressures  persist  for  economic  growth,  especially  among  local 
governments. What might this mean for policy and practice for social analysis in 
this  complex  country  context?  This  article  endeavours  to  illuminate  emerging 
practices in social analysis in China, bringing to a global audience the recent work 
of Chinese scholars on this topic.  
FORMULATION OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
ABSENCE OF REGULATION FOR SOCIAL RISKS AND IMPACTS 
Engaged  social  research  has  longstanding  traditions  in  sociology  and 
anthropology. The US National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969/70 
formally  linked  the  prediction  of  social  impacts  to  the  process  of  investment 
planning in a regulatory framework, requiring analysis, before approval, of likely 
project impacts on human and cultural, as well as physical environments (Burdge 
et al. 2004). With this step NEPA opened the door to the possibility of widening 
investment planning beyond technical and economic criteria in an environmental 
impact statement. It posed the question of how people and communities would 
react  to  planned  investments  in  advance,  creating  a  space  for  integrating  the 
methods and tools of the social sciences in planning investment projects, utilizing 
anthropological and sociological techniques and variables (Burdge et al. 2004)
3.   
                                                 
3 The NEPA decision was based on recognition that negative impacts from investments could 
reduce  or  outweigh  their  benefits,  jeopardizing  success  and  degrading  environments  on  which 
communities depend. NEPA required the application of the social sciences, as well as the natural 
sciences, in advance to predict these negative effects. 5  Social Analysis   
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Where practiced consistently, SIA
4 coalesced into a series of broad stages 
with associated methods. Yet most practitioners contend that SIA has fallen short 
of  its  full  potential  for  decision-making  –  for  determining  which  interventions 
should proceed and how they should do so. This is due to a potent combination of 
legal and administrative uncertainty underscored by lack of understanding, time, 
resources  and  expertise
5  and  perceptions  that  SIA  is  a  subset  of  environmental 
impact assessment, rather than a process in its own right.  
By  the  late  1980s  many  governments  in  were  establishing  their  own 
frameworks for environmental impact assessment (EIA). In most cases the EIA 
framework included at least a requirement for social and economic data – but full 
SIA requires countries to enact the necessary institutional regulations that assign 
responsibilities and resources for SIA application. Very few developing countries 
have taken this important step towards formalising social criteria in planning and 
management  –  and  for  those  that  have,  SIA  may  be  dependent  upon  physical 
impacts as a trigger. This relegates SIA to a reactive step applied to pre-determined 
projects,  rather  than  being  a  key  element  in  decision-making  for  selection  of 
projects. SIA practitioners have continuously explored ways to help SIA meet its 
full  potential  in  global  investment  decision-making  and  preparation
6,  including 
advocating  that  public  or  private  sector  proponents  or  communities  could, in  a 
wider  understanding,  initiate  and  lead  such  a  process  for  SIA  as  ‘an  adaptive 
management approach that is embedded in the culture of companies, governments 
and communities’ (Vanclay and Esteves 2011: 5).  
Most projects in developing countries take place in the absence of SIA – 
there are no formal, national regulatory framework for identifying and managing 
the project social impacts and risks. Instead, an exceptional few investments may 
benefit from the practices of some civil society sponsors or private sector entities 
adopting policies on corporate social responsibility; whilst others may be subject to 
                                                 
4 Legal cases tested the scope of SIA in specific contexts (Burdge et al 2004). NEPA’s explicit 
addition of SIA during the 1970s more systematically documented, this requirement. Environmental 
and social practitioners formed an international impact assessment association in 1981, and prepared 
SIA Guidelines. For example the Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for 
Social Impact Assessment prepared a 1994 Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment. 
5 Barrow 2000, Burdge 2002, 2993a, Burdge et al. 2004, Esteves et al. 2012, Vanclay and 
Esteves 2011. Practitioners of social impact assessment have described it as a poor relation compared 
to environmental impact assessment, a discipline with credibility issues; and subject to ‘myths and 
misunderstandings’ (Burdge 2003b).  
6 See Barrow 2000, Burdge et al. 2004, Mathur 2011, Vanclay and Esteves 2011, Esteves 
2012. The International Association of Impact Assessment (IAIA) launched International Principles 
for SIA (Vanclay 2003), which, whilst still supporting SIA regulation, also advocated efforts outside a 
regulatory framework by communities, governments or corporations to undertake their own SIAs as a 
participative planning exercise shaping and addressing their own development objectives (Becker and 
Vanclay 2003: 2–3). The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) developed new 
Social Impact Assessment International Principles (2003) that also widened the definition beyond the 
project level to encompass any social change process.    Susanna Price  6 
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the policies and procedures of bilateral or multilateral institutions, which I review 
in the next section.    
DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS: FORMATIVE STEPS IN PROJECT APPRAISAL 
Development  institutions  have  for  many  decades  packaged  investment 
projects  as  a  key  form  of  intervention  in  developing  countries  –  many  with 
significant contextual social issues that were initially barely recognized and little 
understood. Social researchers asked: were the ‘social’ or ‘human’ factors to be 
recognized only as an excuse to explain failure (Apthorpe 1970: 7)?  
The  first  social  specialist  recruited  within  the  World  Bank,  Dr.  Michael 
Cernea, found that the normative instructions (1971) for preparing and appraising 
projects required only economic, financial and technical analysis – there was no 
mention at all of social or institutional analysis, no institutional role or position for 
people skilled to do social analysis (Cernea pers. comm. June 2012). Within this 
‘economic  fortress’  the  challenge  facing  Cernea  was  to  translate  theoretical 
sociological  knowledge  into  something  palatable  in  organizational  terms  – 
knowledge for action that encapsulated both sociological content and methodology. 
That  necessitated  intensive  perseverance  to  garner  the  necessary  project  based 
evidence that would demonstrate what disasters unfold when projects are ‘socially 
blind’; lobbying to enhance understanding and to secure the high level commitment 
to change the Bank's 'ground rules' for project appraisal, as the final step in before 
approval  that  would  still  allow  modifications  in  the  project  design  prior  to 
implementation.  
This  change  took  the  form  of  a  conceptual  breakthrough  that  named 
‘sociological  aspects’  as  an  integral  element  of  project  appraisal,  along  with 
economic,  financial,  technical,  commercial  and  institutional  aspects.  The 
instrument  that  formalized  this  requirement  was  a  statement  set  in  the  Bank’s 
central  ‘rulebook’,  the  Operational  Manual  which  took  on  the  status  of  an 
operational policy known as OMS 2.20 (World Bank 1984). Whereas earlier Bank 
appraisal  methodology  (1971)  aimed  only  to  make  a  maximum  impact  on  the 
economic development of its member countries, the new policy set objectives that 
enunciated the importance of both economic and social development amongst its 
borrowers, thus logically augmenting the earlier narrow focus with sociological 
and institutional analyses.  
OMS  2.20  set  a  requirement  for  sociologically-directed  efforts  to  localize 
projects,  before  their  approval,  by  understanding  the  socio-cultural  and 
demographic characteristics of intended beneficiaries – a requirement that called 
for innovations in both content and method. Firstly, the OMS 2.20 required an 
understanding of the ‘size and social structure of the population in the project area, 
its density and stratification patterns, including ethnic, tribal and class composition’ 
(World Bank 1984: 10). This would be essential to project success since social 7  Social Analysis   
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actors were expected to accommodate project interventions, often changing their 
behavior to support project goals. It also permitted targeting for social groups with 
specific  requirements  such  as  ethnic  minorities,  resettled  populations,  and 
women. Secondly,  the  OMS  required  analysis  of  the  social  organization  of 
productive  activities  of  the  population  in  the  project  area;
7  and,  thirdly, 
understanding of the cultural acceptability of the project and its compatibility with 
the behaviour and perceived needs of the intended beneficiaries, to assess whether 
it  would  be  understandable,  agreed  to,  and  capable  of  being  operated  and 
maintained by them
8.  
Finally – an essential forward looking strategy and method for the rest of the 
project investment cycle – this analysis would result in a social strategy to elicit 
and  sustain  beneficiaries'  participation  during  project  implementation  and 
operation. The appraisal team had to verify that the beneficiaries ‘were involved in 
project identification and preparation and that they will continue such participation 
in  project  implementation,  maintenance,  operation,  monitoring  and  evaluation’ 
(Ibid.:  11).  Special  efforts  to  ensure  participation  of  intended  beneficiaries 
generally in implementation and operation and women's participation and benefits 
in particular were needed
9.  
OMS 2.20 represented a catalytic change in that it obliged Bank staff, for the 
first  time,  to  recognize  and  act  upon  the  concept  that  investment  projects,  in 
themselves,  constitute  a  complex  socio-cultural  process  that  could  be  engaged 
through  clear  steps  during  preparation  and,  by  logical  extension,  during 
implementation and completion. In the context of such induced social change these 
steps  could  profoundly  shape  project  acceptability  to  social  actors,  and  hence, 
determine  project  outcomes,  returns,  and  impacts.  The  OMS  2.20  widened  the 
decision-making process to bring in sociological knowledge at a key decision point 
in the organizational dynamics of the project cycle: before approval, when efforts 
could  be  taken  to  redesign  –  even  to  halt  –  certain  projects  which  had  not 
satisfactorily addressed the steps.  
                                                 
7  Analysis  of  the  social  organization  of  productive  activities  included  assessing  how  the 
intended beneficiaries have access to, make use of, and exercise control over productive resources; 
how the prevailing structure of the household and of the family systems affects the development 
potential and constraints, labor availability and ownership patterns; whether small producers have 
reasonable access to, and information on wider markets and regional economies; and how land tenure 
systems  and  usage  rights,  as  well  as  alternative  employment  opportunities,  may  affect  intended 
beneficiaries’ interest in the proposed project activities (World Bank 1984: 10). 
8 This involved a judgment taking into account the values, customs, beliefs and felt needs of 
intended beneficiaries.   
9 For projects which the appraisal team considered to be highly risky in social terms, the OMS 
2.20  required  consideration  of  either  a  pilot  project  or  postponement  of  the  project.  Technical, 
administrative or other aspects that made a project socially not feasible would have to be modified or 
eliminated. The  timeframe  should  be  realistic,  with  mechanisms  for  the  expected  behavioural 
responses to occur, and sufficient flexibility for making design changes in response to socio-cultural 
information obtained during implementation.    Susanna Price  8 
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PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: THE WIDER CASE FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
 
Whereas  the  OMS  2.20  was  an  internal  Bank  document,  in  1985  Cernea 
edited a published volume, drawing together the experience of a number of social 
analysts, that advocated a compelling theme: ‘putting people first’ as the ‘starting 
point, the centre and the end goal of each development intervention’ (Cernea (ed.) 
1991: xiv). This volume contextualized and elaborated upon OMS 2.20 through 
theoretical analysis, practical approaches and case studies, with particular attention 
to rural-based projects. Sociological knowledge provided the necessary tools and 
methods to illuminate social dynamics through conceptual frameworks for action 
research,  and  ‘a  set  of  procedures,  rules  and  approaches  that  instituted  field 
assessments, information exchange and structured interaction between local and 
outside experts’ (Cernea 1991: 26).  
The book made a broader point. It linked the repeated failures plaguing many 
development programs, due to being ‘sociologically ill-informed and ill-conceived’ 
(Cernea 1991: 1), with a reconceptualising shift in development policies away from 
‘trickle down’ theories of economic growth towards poverty alleviation through 
developments aimed specifically at ‘target groups’ which encompassed the poor 
and vulnerable (Cernea 1991: 2). This reconceptualization led directly into policy 
making  in  three  broad,  mutually-reinforcing  directions  in  applying  sociological 
knowledge to development interventions (Cernea 1995, 1996, 1997). The detailed, 
project-specific methodologies for social analysis would form the basis for deriving 
wider principles which would, in turn, form the basis for formulation of social 
policies. The social policies would, again, require detailed procedures for social 
analysis for their implementation in each new case, procedures which would be 
drawn from sociological knowledge, to formulate social policies.  
SOCIAL ANALYSIS GLOBALLY 
Bilateral  donors  (for  example,  AusAID  1989;  ODA  1995)  and  other 
international institutions
10 began to act upon the concept that social analysis formed 
an integral part of project planning and management. In the Asia Pacific’s regional 
multilateral  development  bank,  ADB,  for  example,  Dr.  Sam  Rao  and  staff 
produced official Guidelines
11 that opened by echoing the theme that ‘people are 
the center of development and that development is for all people’ (ADB 1993: 7). 
Widening  of  ADB’s  development  objectives  beyond  economic  growth t o  
encompass poverty reduction, the improved status of women, and human resource 
                                                 
10 See also Harrison, J. and T. McDonald 2003 for a discussion of SIA in  the  Caribb ean 
Regional Development Bank.  
11 ADB Guidelines on Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations (1993) drew 
upon an earlier consultant’s report; it was followed by ADB Handbook for Incorporation of Social 
Dimensions in Projects (1994), Manila.  9  Social Analysis   
 
369 
development
12 called for new approaches, and alluded to project failures where 
social actors had been ignored. The Guidelines identified and mapped the social 
content: a set of social dimensions in operational terms that would allow a greater 
focus  on  people  through  poverty  reduction,  enhanced  role  for  women;  human 
resources  development  and  protecting  vulnerable  groups  (Ibid.:  2−4,  8−10). 
Methodologically, new and mutually reinforcing analytical processes would link 
the social dimensions to planning and implementation: participatory approaches, 
gender  analysis,  benefit  monitoring  and  evaluation,  social  analysis  and  co-
operation with NGOs.   
The  Guidelines  mapped  operational  steps  throughout  ADB’s  lending 
activities. Macro and sector analyses would expand to address questions such as 
the  distribution  of  benefits;  equal  opportunity;  and  social  participation.  At  the 
project  level  incorporating  social  dimensions  was  intended  to  achieve  socially 
responsive projects, with more effective implementation, minimizing social risks, 
and  more  equitably  distributing  benefits,  whilst  building  upon  socio-cultural 
characteristics,  to  underpin  screening,  processing,  appraisal,  management,  and 
evaluation  (ADB  1993).  In  particular,  the  Guidelines  proposed  an  initial  social 
assessment, a scoping exercise conducted early for every project that raised certain 
questions: who were the target population? What were their needs, demands and 
absorptive capacity? Which institutions could be utilized, especially at the local 
level? Was more detailed social design necessary?  
The  Guidelines  shared  some  similar  features  to  OMS  2.20.  They  aligned 
social analysis with newly crafted, supportive strategic objectives that emphasized 
social  as  well  as  economic  development.  Through  the  social  dimensions  they 
constructed and categorised sociological content. They gave operational validity to 
certain new methods of sociological endeavour. Yet they went further than the 
World Bank’s timing of steps before appraisal – they situated social analysis in the 
broader  terrain  of  macro  and  sector  analyses,  project  selection,  project 
implementation, completion and ex-post analysis. ADB’s set of formal case studies 
was  less  developed,  and  the  Guidelines  said  little  about  the  requisite  social 
expertise, but ADB was, in fact, in process of recognizing the designation of social 
development specialist and recruiting such expertise, in small numbers, creating 
institutional space for sociological knowledge in a Social Development Unit. When 
first  introduced,  the  Guidelines  were  conceptualized,  rather  tentatively,  as  ‘an 
overall framework to assist policy makers and practitioners’ (ibid. v). Some key 
elements,  such  as  the  initial  social  scoping,  had  to  await  a  stronger  mandate 
through Board-approved policies on resettlement (ADB 1995), indigenous peoples 
(1998) and gender and development (1998); whilst other elements awaited a 1997 
Operations Manual section entitled Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB 
Operations (revised in 2007 and subsequently – ADB 2010a).   
                                                 
12 The ADB’s Strategic Framework 1992−1995.    Susanna Price  10 
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SOCIAL ANALYSIS FOR SAFEGUARD POLICIES 
 
Social analysis formed an essential component of policies prepared at the 
World Bank on involuntary resettlement (1980), to protect people in the way of 
development projects and, in 1982 on indigenous peoples (Davis 2004). These two 
policies coalesced to become the social safeguards, which depend, in each new 
application, upon detailed forms of social and economic analysis. For example, the 
World  Bank  requires  detailed  resettlement  planning  and  implementation 
arrangements in each new case of displacement,  based upon direct, interactive, 
participative fieldwork
13.  
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
CHALLENGES IN PRACTICE 
 
Were  these  policies  and  procedures  applied?  Or  were  they  simply  policy 
artefacts, an analysis of discourse, devoid of effective agency? Whilst stand-alone, 
thematic  evaluation  of  the  application  and  outcomes  of  social  analysis  is  rare, 
reports  hint  at  various  impediments  that  determined  a  slow  pace  of  adoption: 
limited awareness, commitment and expertise not only amongst institutional staff 
but in-country; time constraints in the processing cycle; and resource constraints. 
Where procedures were followed, they often risked a kind of on-paper tokenism.   
A full decade after OMS 2.20, Cernea and Kudat (1997) reflected upon the 
expanding use of social analysis in World Bank operations, and its demonstrated 
value adding for all stages of the project investment cycle; and, increasingly, for 
policy  based  work  and  country  analysis.  Presenting  case  studies  in  utilities 
investments – water supply, sanitation, urban transport and energy – from a new 
client base of Russia and the Central Asian Republics, they contended that social 
analysis
14 provided a rich avenue of enquiry to engage with stakeholders in this 
hitherto unfamiliar, and now socially dynamic, territory.  
Yet  social  analysts  clearly  had  to  deliver  incrementally  more  to  achieve 
recognition – to ‘pay their own way in the coin of incremental bodies of knowledge 
                                                 
13 This includes land survey; census and socio-economic survey of the people to be displaced 
including  their  population  parameters,  their  forms  of  organisation  and  settlement,  resource  use, 
networks  and  productive  activities;  structured  interactions  to  inform  and  engage  those  people  in 
resettlement planning decisions; setting of eligibility criteria and resettlement entitlements; feasibility 
assessments for resettlement sites and for livelihood improvement; and plans for involving displaced 
people during the resettlement process and its aftermath (World Bank 2004). The IFC also encourages 
community outreach, and has a manual for stakeholder engagement (IFC 2007). 
14 These studies utilized a range of sociological methods at different times in the investment 
cycle:  quantifiable  social  surveys,  focus  groups,  individual  interviews,  in-depth  case  studies, 
secondary data review, participatory processes such as stakeholder workshops, poverty assessments, 
affordability analysis. They involved a wide range of social actors. 11  Social Analysis   
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and  operational  recommendations,  clearly  additional  to  knowledge  supplied  by 
other analytical tools’ (ibid.: 5). Many projects had no sociological appraisal, and 
‘compliance  with  the  new  guidelines  was  far  from  general’.  The  reasons?  The 
authors  cited  inertia,  technocratic  or  econocratic  approaches,  lack  of  awareness 
about  the  power  of  sociological  investigation,  traditional  mindsets  or  obsolete 
development paradigms. This highlighted the gap between guidelines and practice: 
in that ‘placing new rules on the Bank’s internal guidebooks was not enough for 
triggering the profound changes in staff work patterns’ (ibid.: 6) that are necessary 
for  full  implementation.  New  rules  could  even  be  forgotten  –  the  sociological 
component  had  been  left  out  of  a  revised  appraisal  procedure  format  in  1994, 
necessitating counter-action by a central social policy group (ibid.: 6). 
Similarly, the challenge for full implementation of the safeguard policies is 
ongoing
15. Whilst the World Bank, for example, seeks to strengthen the ability of 
borrowing  countries  to  apply  safeguard  performance  and  monitoring,  and  to 
involve and consult with stakeholders, such as the general public and NGOs, it 
recognizes  that  safeguard  policy  implementation  ‘is  a  highly  complex  activity, 
much effort is needed to build capacity in developing countries at various levels 
ranging from government agencies to civil society’ (World Bank 2012). 
Compared  to  other  social  issues,  however,  social  safeguards  have  been 
viewed as privileged in the competition for scarce institutional resources. A lead 
social specialist at the World Bank found that:  
The  external  noise,  and  the  consequent  internal  reaction  to  enforce 
compliance and full mitigation… has led to a crowding out of attention to other 
social  domains…  This  dilemma  has  not  been  unique  to  the  World  Bank… 
Although ADB requires all projects to undergo an initial social assessments, more 
detailed  work  tends  to  be  commissioned  primarily  when  significant  adverse 
impacts, such as resettlement is identified (Dani 2003: 11). 
Yet an ADB evaluation found that, even for projects with resettlement issues, 
generally,  initial  social  assessment  and  subsequent  social  preparation  was 
inadequate (ADB 2000). Whilst ADB began recruiting social development staff in 
the  early  1990s,  their  role  structurally  was  an  advisory one;  whilst  the  lack  of 
formal mechanisms for social analysis, SIA or social safeguards presented a range 
of  challenges  for  application  in  each  country.  Project  team  leaders  knew  they 
would continue to be judged primarily on the speed with which they could process 
loans – ADB’s ‘core business’ of lending. Key steps in loan processing remained at 
their discretion, including the time and effort spent on the now mandatory social 
scoping, and subsequent preparatory work. 
                                                 
15 The World Bank’s recent Learning Review on Implementation of the Policy on Indigenous 
Peoples found issues that needed further improvement to achieve full compliance (World Bank 2011).    Susanna Price  12 
 
372 
CREATING INSTITUTIONAL SPACE 
 
Despite  uneven  application,  however,  these  policies  and  procedures  had 
major  impacts  in  policy  dialogue.  OMS  2.20,  for  example,  triggered  policy 
discussion  within  the  institution,  among  borrowers,  and  among  social  actors  in 
different contexts. For a formative period during the Bank’s history the OMS 2.20 
represented  an  enabling  policy  for  work  on  social  dimensions  (Davis  2004).  It 
articulated and legitimized a balance in the Bank’s objectives between economic 
and social development – thus logically demanding tools and approaches to support 
social  development.  It  linked  poverty  alleviation  with  sociological  as  well  as 
economic variables. It was the first formal Bank policy to focus on the importance 
of women during project appraisal, on their potential role in project implementation 
and on project impacts upon them (Davis 2004). It was the first formal policy to 
focus on the importance of beneficiary participation and local organizations during 
project  preparation,  and  to  require  a  strategy  to  engage  them,  not  just  during 
preparation,  but  through  the  life  of  the  project.  Amongst  others,  it  stimulated 
further work on gender, participation, local level organizations, social factors of 
poverty and benefits distribution. In this sense the OMS 2.20 provided an internal 
conceptual  and  organizational  mandate  both  for  project  level  actions  and  for 
enriching and extending sociological knowledge more broadly within the Bank’s 
development models – it provided an essential early step towards the Community 
Development  Framework  (CDF),  as  discussed  below.  The  OMS  2.20  created 
institutional space for sociological knowledge, called for more social specialists as 
professionals in appraisal, and began to generate a flow of social information that, 
in itself, led to new questions and new lines of enquiry.  
The spread of the World Bank’s policies on involuntary resettlement (1980) 
and indigenous peoples (1982) in forms adapted to other and international financial 
institutions such as ADB and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (1998) 
coalesced as an international benchmark for a ‘social safeguard’
16. The resettlement 
benchmark spread to bilateral donors through Guidelines
17 of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1992); and to the United Nations 
through  the  Guiding  Principles  on  Internal  Displacement  which  encompass 
development-forced displacement amongst other forms (United Nations 2004).   
Private sector entities doing business with financial institutions such as ADB 
or IFC must meet the safeguard standards of those institutions. Leveraging extends 
the policy reach – for example, all the components of a project which is jointly-
                                                 
16 The current form of the World Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement is referenced at 
World Bank 2002; and on indigenous peoples is at World Bank 2005. ADB approved policies on 
involuntary resettlement (1995) and on indigenous peoples (1998), both subsequently revised in 2009.  
17 ‘Guidelines  for  Aid  Agencies  on  Involuntary  Displacement  and  Resettlement’  of  the 
Development  Assistance  Committee  of  the  OECD  (OECD  1992).  Some  bilateral  donors  have 
prepared their own policies on resettlement in accordance with these principles.  13  Social Analysis   
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financed with the World Bank must comply with World Bank policies, including 
those components financed by other agencies, whether from the public or private 
sector.    Private  sector  entities  such  as  the  Equator  Principles f o r  f i n a n c i a l  
institutions have also adopted, voluntarily, codes based on these standards (Cernea 
2005). The Equator Principles, with over 70 signatory financial institutions, now 
claim approximately 70 per cent of international project finance debt in emerging 
markets. Signatories undertake only to lend to projects which are both willing and 
able to comply with the Equator Principle standard on social and environmental 
policies and procedures (Equator Principles 2012). The procedures, based on the 
newly revised (January 2012) Performance Standards of the IFC, draw upon World 
Bank  policies  and  procedures,  and  encompass  environmental  and  social 
management  systems, labour and working conditions, community health, safety 
and security, land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples and 
cultural heritage, amongst others (IFC 2011)
18. Social management systems link 
policy  objectives  with  institutional  priorities,  implementation  strategies, 
stakeholder identification and engagement, resource deployment, monitoring and 
evaluation.  Casting  social  analysis  into  a  business  management  process,  for 
example, IFC’s Performance Standard 1 envisions that private sector clients will 
establish an effective Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) as a 
dynamic  and  continuous  process  initiated  and  supported  by  management… 
involves engagement between the client, its workers, local communities directly 
affected  by  the  project...  Drawing  on  the  elements  of  the  established  business 
management  process  of  “plan,  do,  check,  and  act”,  the  ESMS  entails  a 
methodological approach to managing environmental and social risks… and can 
lead to improved financial, social, and environmental outcomes (IFC 2011).  
WIDER POLICY IMPACTS – PERVERSE REVERSALS IN PRACTICE 
The phrase ‘putting people first’ assumed a new prominence in global policy 
statements, as the discourse of development widened. In the United Nations’ (UN) 
World Summit for Social Development (1995), for example, governments reached 
‘a new consensus on the need to put people at the centre of development pledging 
to make the conquest of poverty, the goal of full employment and the fostering of 
social integration overriding objectives of development’ (United Nations 1995). 
This work paved the way for the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(2001) which reflected both income and non-income poverty reduction targets, and 
would be ratified by governments and agencies around the globe.   
Increasing scrutiny, intensifying during the 1990s by civil society groups, 
parliamentarians, and non-finance ministry officials in both borrowing and funding 
                                                 
18 The  IFC  also  encourages  community  outreach,  and  has  a  manual  for  stakeholder 
engagement (IFC 2007).   Susanna Price  14 
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countries placed multilateral and bilateral development agencies under pressure to 
widen the policy agenda.   
ADB  adopted  explicit  objectives  of  poverty  reduction  complementing 
policies on social safeguards, gender and development, co-operation with NGOs, 
and social protection. The World Bank’s CDF had the expressed intention to put 
people and poverty reduction at the centre, prioritizing partnerships and promoting 
knowledge  (Kagia  2005).  Building  upon  the  World  Bank’s  social  safeguard 
policies the CDF broadened the social development agenda drawing upon the work 
of internal social development specialists (Davis 2004). The CDF encompassed, 
but  looked  beyond,  the  project  cycle  to  an  ‘empowerment  agenda’  involving 
community  driven  development,  civic  engagement,  and  social  accountability, 
which delivered huge loans directed under innovative governance arrangements 
towards local levels of government and civil society (Ibid).  Social analysts began 
to develop new analytical tools for different levels of social reality: local, meso, 
macro,  regional  or  global.  The  multi-dimensionality  of  poverty  required  social 
analysis. This entailed social analysis at three levels: firstly, macro-social analysis 
of  the  ‘socio-cultural,  institutional,  historical,  and  political  context  carried  out 
upstream  as  inputs  into  the  Country  Assistance  Strategy  (CAS)  process,  or  to 
support policy formulation and sector strategies’ (World Bank 2003b: 7). Secondly, 
sociological appraisal addressed the ‘opportunities, constraints and likely impacts 
as  an  integral  part  of  project  appraisal  to  judge  whether  the  project’s  social 
development  outcomes  have  been  clearly  identified,  the  project  is  socially 
sustainable and Bank support is justified’ (ibid.). Thirdly, social assessment would 
be  ‘undertaken  by  the  Borrower  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the v i e w s  o f  
stakeholders  in  order  to  improve  the  design  of  the  project  and  establishing  a 
participatory process  for  implementation  and  monitoring  (ibid.).  Social  analysts 
advocated taking social analysis to proactively select and design strategic poverty 
reduction interventions, together with economic analysis (Dani 2003: 2) through 
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) (WB 2003a). An evaluation in 2009 
found that, whilst some PSIA had been very effective, overall the approach had 
been limited, requiring new financing and invigoration (Dani and Beddies 2011). 
Whilst  objectives  were  shifting  to  emphasise  people-oriented  poverty 
reduction and social development, in a perverse reversal the institutions, concerned 
about undermining the core business of lending began to explore faster lending 
modalities. Earlier policy and procedures on social analysis, focused as they were 
on  projects  investments  with  identifiable  populations  in  a  zone  of  impact, 
particularly for rural-based projects, had limited application to new modalities such 
as the World Bank’s structural adjustment, sector-wide approaches, programmatic 
and policy based lending and a shift from infrastructure to social sector services. 
As a result, in 2003 a Senior World Bank Social Analyst wrote: ‘Most staff today 
are not even aware about the existence of … OMS (2.20)’ (Dani 2003: 8−9). 
ADB based its overarching poverty reduction policy (ADB 1999) on the twin 
pillars  of  economic  growth  and  social  development.  Current  ADB  policy  and 15  Social Analysis   
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operational procedures build upon this foundation to articulate links between social 
analysis, social development and the achievement of ADB’s overarching goal of 
poverty  reduction.  These  procedures  apply  to  ADB’s  public  and  private  sector 
projects and programs (ADB 2007, 2010) – yet, in another disjuncture between 
policies and practice, the procedures are not reflected in conceptual, operational or 
financing strategies in ADB’s current Long Term Strategic Framework 2020 (ADB 
2008). This framework does not refer to social development.  
ADB in 2005 officially linked a stagnation in loan approvals
19 with a need for 
‘new products and less arduous procedures’ including safeguard ‘improvements’ 
(ADB 2006: 7). It proposed an Innovation and Efficiency Initiative that would 
reduce  transaction  costs,  streamline  and  simplify  business  processes  and 
developing new financing instruments and modalities to become ‘more client- and 
results-oriented, and efficient’ (ibid.: 11). New financial instruments such as the 
multitranche financing facility, mainstreamed in 2008, would move more money 
faster,  involving  less  scrutiny  since  most  sub-projects  were  to  be  prepared  and 
approved only after Board approval. 
 
CHINA: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND CHANGING SOCIAL SPACES 
 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
China’s steps towards forms of social assessment for investment projects is 
occurring as China tempers its focussed pursuit of economic growth with explicitly 
articulated concerns for the social costs of that growth – and as China shifts from 
‘command and control’ modes of governing to modes of governing that open up 
new social spaces and opportunities (Price 2007). The national  government has 
formally  replaced  a  focus  on  GDP  growth  as  the  single  most  important 
performance indicator for local government officials (Zheng and Fewsmith (eds) 
2008) by a concern with growth that balances economic and social development.   
The transition from a centrally planned state to a socialist market economy 
has involved the selective transformation of the state and its processes to support 
the market and to align more closely with a range of international standards. This 
entailed  new  modes  of  governing  through  extensive  reorganisation  of  state 
government, especially during the period of Zhu Rongji’s reforms (1998−2000). 
Administrative reorganisation, decentralisation, industrial and financial reform now 
permit  new  forms  of  interaction  between  market  and  state,  and  ne w  f o r m s  o f  
networking through the information society (Ong and Zhang 2008). Concepts of 
                                                 
19 ADB’s loan approvals had stood at about $5.2 billion a year over the previous 10 years. 
Ordinary capital resource (OCR) disbursements had declined steadily, with a 38 per cent drop in 
ADB’s gross annual income (ADB 2006: 6).   Susanna Price  16 
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government versus governance have been compared and debated, between ‘power 
of  government  operating  from  top  down…  primarily  through  orders,  statutes, 
bureaucracy and coercion’ and ‘power of governance’ which operates ‘mutually… 
primarily  through  collaboration,  coordination,  negotiation,  social  networking, 
identity and consensus’ (Yu 2002 in Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 12). Xu (2009: 40) 
credited the World Bank and United Nations with a recent shift from ‘letting the 
market decide’ to correcting ‘market imperfections’ by ‘paying more attention to 
social aspects of the market economy, especially through governance’.  
Managing  the  market  in  the  context  of  growing  decentralisation  and 
inequality poses significant challenges if benefits are to be shared equitably. Whilst 
poverty  overall  has  been  significantly  reduced  in  China,  there  are  growing 
inequalities within cities, between cities and the countryside, and between regions 
(Xu and Zhang 2010; Sutherland and Yao 2011). Large investment projects can 
entail significant technical, environmental and social risks, as evidenced in recent 
the rise in recorded civil disturbances (CSSA 2010), the vast majority of which 
were caused  by land acquisition, resettlement compensation, and environmental 
pollution related to project investments. Similarly the use of the xinfang (letters of 
complaint)  has  increased,  a  mechanism  for  lodging  complaints  with  higher 
authorities  and  seeking  justice,  especially  focusing  on  corruption  and  land 
acquisition problems (Perry 2010).  
 
ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF TRANSFORMATION 
 
With the new spaces and increasing complexity in China’s social fabric, the 
leadership  has  been  exploring  strategies  to  address  the  social  costs  of 
transformation, and to foster a balanced and harmonious society. For example, by 
2003  the  leadership  had  articulated  a  ‘new  development  perspective’  (xin 
fazhanguan), that broadens objectives beyond economic growth in favor of ‘putting 
people at the centre’ (yi ren wei ben) (Gransow and Price (eds) 2007: 4). Whilst 
retaining ambitious economic growth targets, for the first time the 11
th Five-Y ear 
National Plan for Economic and Social Development recognised certain limits to 
economic growth, and introduced the idea that improving life quality matters. The 
12
th  Five-Year  National  Plan  for  Economic  and  Social  Development  (2011) 
continued  these  themes.  Recognizing  that  income  increases  had  lagged  behind 
economic  growth,  the  Plan  expressed  a  core  goal  to  build  a  fairer  society  by 
spreading  the  wealth  more  evenly  among  China’s  1.34  billion  population,  by 
boosting spending on education, health care and public housing, and initiatives 
intended to narrow the wealth gap between the rich and poor. Leaders criticized the 
‘outdated mindset and the GDP-oriented criteria for evaluating the performance of 
government officials as obstacles that might keep the five-year plan from being 
fully realised. The central government would adopt new performance evaluation 
criteria for local governments and give more weight to the efficiency of economic 
growth, environment protection and living standards’ (Zhang 2011). 17  Social Analysis   
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China  officially  recognizes  social  development  objectives,  the  central 
planning agency, the National Development Research Council (NDRC) having a 
mandate  for  overall  coordination  between  economic  and  social  development, 
through  the  annual,  medium  and  long-term  development  plans;  by  regulating 
project investments; by monitoring social development trends; and by formulating 
and  implementing  social  development  strategies,  laws  and  regulations,  amongst 
others  (NDRC  2012).  The  challenge  will  be  to  realize  such  objectives,  change 
resource  allocation  decisions  and  achieve  full  implementation  of  state  policies, 
laws and regulations at the local level in the context of persistent systemic and 
structural features that continue to reinforce practices favouring economic growth 
(Naughton  2010:  84).  This  includes,  for  example,  intense  pressures  for  land 
development,  whether  legal  or  illegal,  by  local  governments  at  various 
administrative levels (Lin 2009: 6). 
NEW SPACES FOR SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
China has long held a tradition of field research as a basis for shaping social 
action to promote modernisation (Gransow 2003, Guldin 1994). Zheng described a 
‘tortuous  path’  (2006:  19)  of  sociology  comprising  activity  and  then  forced 
isolation, which has been marked by a recurring theme: ‘Chinese social reality’ has 
consistently localized foreign theories and methods (Zheng 2006: 19−20).  
The term ‘harmonious social development’, articulating a vision of a more 
socially aware, less destructive type of growth arose in the Chinese discipline of 
sociology (Zheng 2006: 34). China’s recent policy goal of building an ‘all-round 
well-off  and  harmonious  society’  has  allowed  certain  problems  to  be  named, 
contributing to ‘the identification of such problems as social problems’ (Xu 2009: 
39). As part of the policy, central government has called on specifically social and 
local forces to provide social services, and thereby assist the state in building the 
'harmonious society’ – through the control of those social forces under the auspices 
of the governing Party. These developments have led to a new emphasis on the 
deployment of social scientists, especially to work on issues surrounding social 
stratification.  ‘Chinese  sociologists,  demographers  and  statisticians  are  at  the 
forefront  in  providing  the  expert  knowledge  required  for  a  discursive  and 
epistemological  shift  away  from  GDP  oriented  growth’  with  a  new  focus  on 
inequality (ibid.: 46). In terms of governmental technologies, do these measures to 
‘tame protests and to solve what the leadership deems to be specifically ‘social’ 
problems’  by  turning  ‘problem  identification  and  solution  into  an  ‘arts  of 
government’ rather than a process leading to the need for systemic change’ (ibid.: 
45)? Increasingly, social analysts participate in investment planning and appraisal 
preceding decisions on major state investment projects (CIECC 2004).    Susanna Price  18 
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SOCIAL ASSESSMENT IN CHINA 
Since 1978, China has reformed in stages the centralized planning system for 
investment decision making, requiring feasibility studies for significant investment 
projects  from  the  1980s  (Ping  2009),  and  developing  methods  for  investment 
appraisal as practiced internationally, focusing initially upon economic appraisal 
methods (CIECC 2004). This later expanded to encompass environmental impact 
assessment under an environmental regulatory system (CIECC 2004).  
Social issues reached investment planning through incremental steps from the 
1980s onwards. From 1993, participatory social assessments were permitted for 
internationally funded projects. The 2003 EIA Act expanded earlier laws, requiring 
people’s  participation  in  environmental  management.  A  2012  Ministry  of 
Environment  EIA  Technical  Guideline,  to  be  regulated  through  the  EIA 
framework,  strengthens  requirements  for  stakeholder  engagement  ‘up  front’  in 
project preparation and requires SIA for projects with construction impacts (Xiao 
et  al.  2012).  SIA  includes  a  socio-economic  baseline  and  prediction  of  social 
impacts  through  quantitative  or  qualitative  analysis,  to  be  managed  through 
mitigation. The Guidelines focus on a key social risk factor, land acquisition (see 
below),  but  also  encompass  public  health,  cultural  heritage  and  community 
infrastructure. This important step will be implemented initially as a pilot.  
Systematic studies on project-based social assessment methodology in China 
started from the 1980s. A detailed research paper on its use in investment projects 
appeared in 1993 (Wang and Marsden 1993). Later studies were primarily carried 
out  by  the  China  International  Engineering  Consulting  Corporation  (CIECC); 
Investment Research Institute of the State Planning Commission (now the NDRC); 
and the Research Institute for Standards and Norms of the Ministry of Construction 
(RISN), resulting in a number of publications. Key Chinese sectoral agencies have 
prepared in-house documents setting out methods for social assessment that could 
be selectively applied in project preparation. NDRC has endorsed several recent 
Guidelines  setting  out  requirements  for  social  assessment  and  resettlement 
planning along with economic, financial, and environmental assessment in certain 
public and private projects (CIECC 2004).  
A 2002 NDRC-endorsed Guideline, which, for the first time integrated social 
assessment into feasibility studies, along with economic, financial, environmental, 
technical  and  other  parameters,  presents  a  wide-ranging  and  comprehensive 
mapping of social assessment that looks for opportunities for enhanced impact as 
well as social risk management. The Guideline, adopting a participatory approach, 
defined the role and scope of social assessment, introduced the major components 
and  presented  procedures  and  techniques  for  social  assessment.  The  three  key 
elements are a social impact assessment, an analysis of the ‘mutual adaptability’ of 
the project and its regional social environment, and a social risk analysis. It defined 19  Social Analysis   
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the social content to include incomes, living standards, likely impacts, stakeholder 
identification and analysis
20.   
Next,  the  analysis  of  ‘mutual  adaptability’  between  the  project  and  its 
regional social environment aimed to engage key stakeholders and enhance the 
project design in light of social variables
21. Finally, social risk analysis focused on 
possible sources of social, ethnic or religious conflict, and designed measures to 
avoid, reduce or mitigate those risks (Ibid.: 8−9).  
Whilst  the  government  has  taken  important  steps  towards  establishing 
methods  and  content  for  social  assessment,  major  challenges  remain  to  its  full 
implementation  throughout  the  investment  project  cycle,  in  the  context  of  a 
transforming  investment  management  system  (State  Council  2004)  and  through 
local government responses to policy shifts from above.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Policies  and  procedures  constructing  the  content  and  methods  for  social 
analysis  are  resonating  in  China.  Yet  challenges  remain  in  China  and  other 
developing countries that are still without the key legal and institutional elements 
of regulatory framework for SIA or other formal mechanisms that allow them to 
identify and manage the social process, including social risks and opportunities for 
project investments, in the context of induced development. 
Social  analysis,  building  on  pioneering  work  that  mobilized  support,  has 
achieved  a  measure  of  recognition  internationally  in  investment  planning  and 
management  alongside  economic,  financial,  environmental  and  othe r  f o r m s  o f  
analysis. Increasingly, both public and private sector investors recognize that it is 
                                                 
20 The social assessment has eight essential elements: a study on how the project will affect 
local residents' income and their job assignments; a study on likely project impact on affected people's 
living  standards  and  quality  of  life;  an  analysis  of  the  likely  project  effects  on  local  residents 
employment situation; an identification and review of stakeholders, determining the degree to which 
affected  groups  might  suffer losses  that  require  appropriate compensation  means  and  methods;  a 
focus  on  analyzing  the  likely  positive  and  negative  project  effects  on  vulnerable  groups  such  as 
women, children and the handicapped; an analysis of the likely project effects on the level of local 
infrastructure and social services; and, finally, an analysis of the impact on the customs and religious 
beliefs of the local ethnic minorities (quoted in Gransow and Price 2007: 9). 
21 In a three stage process social assessment involves, firstly, investigating and forecasting the 
attitudes towards the project of different interest groups, assessing the degree to which these groups 
can be expected to become involved, with the ultimate aim of selecting a participatory process that 
can contribute to project success. Secondly, it requires investigating and forecasting the attitudes 
towards the project of local organisations, assessing the degree to which these groups can be expected 
to  support  the  project.  Thirdly,  it  requires  reviewing  prospects  for  utilizing  locally  available 
technology,  together  with  the  degree  of  match  between  local  culture  and  the  project  design,  to 
maximize complementary and sustainable approaches (Ibid.: 8–9).   Susanna Price  20 
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in their own interest to manage investments so as to gain public trust by engaging 
those  social  actors  who  will  help  to  determine  the  degree  of  success  and 
sustainability.  International  and  bilateral  organisations  and,  increasingly, 
governments  issue  guidelines  for  forms  of  social  analysis  or  SIA  that  may 
encompass  the  entire  investment  project  cycle.  Private  sector  entities  gradually 
adopt, voluntarily, codes for managing social risk, and social management systems 
that engage with stakeholders to address those risks and opportunities through the 
life of a project. Social analysis has proved itself integral to the application of 
policies  protecting  those  at  risk  in  projects  –  the  displaced,  the  indigenous, 
minorities;  and  to  understanding  the  socio-cultural  dynamics  of  the  multi-
dimensionality of poverty.  
Yet  this  analysis  demonstrates  that  constructive  transformation  requires 
application as well as statements – or policies and procedures  risk remaining a 
‘policy artefact’, a ‘text’ without ‘effect’. The written word does not necessarily 
remove  ‘on-paper’  tokenism,  nor  eliminate  those  slippages  in  organizational 
support  between  the  guidelines  and  their  practice,  nor  overcome  neglect  nor 
challenges that may empty out policy statements of their efficacy. Policies and 
procedures do not necessarily eliminate the ambiguities and disjunctures as projects 
and programs roll out on the ground, nor capture opportunities, nor protect people 
at risk of induced change. Realising that full potential depends upon the level of 
commitment  to  their  articulated  policy  frameworks  by  key  development 
organisations and corporations, with provision of the necessary capacities, time and 
resources. In each country, realising that full potential depends on enactment of 
legislative and regulatory frameworks that encompass participative social analysis 
as  a  strategic  device,  backed  by  supportive  institutional  responsibilities  and 
appropriate resources, with mandates to address the social factors of poverty.      
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